Of Signs and Serpents
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It has recently been debated whether it is appropriate to fly the Gadsden flag in a public setting. Those who are in support of this action hold this flag as a sign that values individual liberty in the face of tyranny and thus argue for its public display as a reminder of the constant vigilance we must exercise in retaining a free society. Contrastingly, on the anti-side are those who view its display as a sign representing bigotry, intolerance, and white supremacy because of the flag's use by some modern groups who advocate such things. It is argued by this latter side that flags say different things to different people and, although it may mean inoffensive- even laudable- ideas to some, to others who draw such a negative impression from its display the hurt is so severe the offense of the offended outweighs the admiration of those who appreciate its veneration; therefore, it is argued the Gadsden snake must be removed from common sight. But the premises that lead to the latter group's conclusion might very well be questioned and if shown false, the conclusion to remove the flag in question would not follow. So let us here scrutinize these notions with the hope of determining a winner in the debate.
Can a flag really mean vastly different things to different groups of people? Can flags say contradictory things to those who finds themselves under their shadows? Can they carry various meanings in disharmony with each other? Can only subjective meaning be given to a flag to the neglect of acknowledging any ultimate value it might hold? To put it more succinctly, is one interpretation of a flag's meaning more correct than another?
If one agrees with the aforementioned statement that "flags say different things to different people," thus limiting the scope of a flag's meaning to the subjective impression of the viewer, one must recognize intellectual and moral dilemmas that will inevitably result from such thinking.
Let us take for instance the flying of the flag of the United States of America. To most, the sign of the Stars and Stripes points to the union of the different states (as represented by the stars) which began as a union of different colonies (as represented by the stripes). The colors of red, white, and blue represent the blood and courage demanded to keep this union protected, the aspired and longed for innocence of the nation, and the justice that reigns over all within this country's borders respectively. This interpretation is pretty straightforward and common, leading most U.S. citizens to respect and venerate the flag of Uncle Sam. However, to others the American flag represents something different. To these the flag represents a country that has institutionalized injustice to such an extent it causes them to kneel when it is being honored by others or trample upon it at a rally as it burns. By either action- of kneeling or trampling- they wish to show they reject the value the former group places in this sign as a symbol of freedom and instead view it as a sign of freedom's polar opposite: oppression.
Now, if we are to affirm that "flags say different things to different people", what are we to make of this conundrum we are presented with when one sign holds antithetical meanings? Have we become so paralyzed by our sensitivity to one side's distaste for a commonly appreciated flag that we now view both contrasting interpretations of the same sign as equally just and fair? Can we reasonably argue that one side is right to venerate it while the other is also right to burn it?
While bearing in mind the lunacy that exists in such a situation, let us consider another example: the flag of the National Socialist German Workers Party. To some, the swastika upon white and red is a sign of the pride of the Germanic race causing this group to appreciate its veneration. On the other hand, to others it is the sign of this same race's subjection and attempted annihilation of another causing this different group to hold the Nazi flag in ignominy. Now, if we are to subscribe to such an uncritical mindset as represented in the idea of respecting how different flags speak to different people, we can never come to the point of acknowledging that one interpretation of a flag's meaning is morally superior or accurate than another. In this view that places such confidence in the subject as the arbiter of meaning, it is right and just for each side to honor and decry the Nazi flag simultaneously. Meanwhile, we, who are trying to theoretically adopt the position of relativistic onlookers, hopelessly have our hands tied behind our backs, incapable of choosing which side to join because we cannot determine any side as being right or wrong in its interpretation. Let the Nazi flag be unfurled in glory or brought down in shame but let us never think one side is actually correct in how they look upon it.
We can see from these two examples that if we refuse to acknowledge the correct or incorrect interpretations of these signs we call flags, a type of nonsense results that disallows us to effectively communicate through the medium of displaying these flags in the first place. So far this is just apropos of flags, but it may do us well to ask: Do we allow ourselves to similarly evaluate other types of signs in such a subjective way that leads to our own confusion? For the real danger has only begun if we do not limit this relativism to mere talk of flags.
What about those other types of signs and symbols we call words and language? Are not words symbols that carry an inherent meaning in themselves irrespective of an individual's desire in using them? For a word is a sign of an idea. And if a word's signification just so happens to be rejected, is it not to both the speaker's and listener's peril? No longer could the two communicate without a shared understanding of terms.
Surely deconstructionists would disagree with this idea that universal meaning can be applied to anything- let alone language; but, a reasonable person must concede it is essential that signs like words have an objective meaning shared by the users of a language in order for real communication to occur. If they do not, how could a genuine deconstructer of language even argue his point when his own philosophy saws off the branch upon which he sits by denying any mutual understanding-between himself and his dialoguer- of the terms he uses? (See Marcelo Pera's essay, "Relativism, Christianity, and the West" in Without Roots by Joseph Ratzinger and Marcelo Pera for an adequate refutation of deconstructionist relativism).
Is that not the theory behind having dictionaries used as authoritative sources of objectivity when it comes to defining words? If we lacked such objectivity in our language, the residents of Babel would be no more challenged in their communication with one another than we in the incoherence of our speech! Words- like all signs- must have a stable meaning that cannot be changed willy-nilly if we are to expect them to retain any meaning at all. One could rightly call to mind an apt comparison Monsignor Knox makes to the game of croquet as played in Wonderland: "You will be very much in the position of the people in Alice in Wonderland, trying to play croquet with flamingoes for mallets and hedgehogs for croquet-balls; the flamingoes were always curling their necks round and the hedgehogs were always running away, so that you never got much farther. You must have a mallet which moves only when you make it move; you must have a croquet-ball which stays put until you hit it, or the game is not croquet. In the same way, all measurement and all thought depend on the possession of a fixed unit by which your judgements can be compared" (Ronald Knox, In Soft Garments).
This is not to say that the meaning of words can never be altered or nuanced; but for these changes to make sense and take root they must be organic and endure over a long period of time. It is in recent history that, much like with the meaning of the Gadsden flag, various attempts have been made to change the meaning of certain words abruptly (e.g. marriage, gender, human, man, woman, vaccine, recession). Sometimes these definition-changes came about through court decisions that sought to create rights where none ever existed; sometimes by popular use among indiscriminate thinkers at university levels; sometimes by for-profit companies that could financially gain a lot by tampering with words as it relates to their product; sometimes for political purposes that attempt to erase history in a Winstonesque fashion so a political party can save face even at the expense of gaslighting their rivals. These word-changes have sometimes even bumped their way into the dictionary, thus leading to an overall lack of clarity- if not outright confusion- to those who choose to debate a given word's meaning from one year's definition of it to another's. We see in the realm of language that we need a stability of meaning when it comes to the use of words if we are to expect one word to mean the same thing one day as it does the next.
Yet, in addition to language- in a more abstract but not less real way- ethics can also provide us an example of the necessity of the stability of meaning when it comes to interpreting signs and symbols- with the only difference being in ethics we are evaluating not flags or words, as things that point beyond themselves to deeper ideas, but human conduct. For moral actions can similarly be seen as signs pointing to real, metaphysical goodness or real, existent evil. The moral judgement of human conduct can likewise be anchored in such black and white realities as word-definitions can, they need not be left to float in ambiguity. But the only way to recognize the connection between a specific act and the order or disorder inherent in it is to acknowledge an objective standard in evaluating the rightness or wrongness of acts themselves. If we are to reject such a standard that gives moral value to human deeds, there is no way to avoid the depravity that will result in our ethical conduct which has now consequently subscribed to the relativistic thinking we have so far been critiquing: that is, that signs mean different things to different people. Instead, we must move beyond mere subjective evaluations of actions and tap into an unchanging, objective standard that lies beyond mere individual preference or experience. If this is not done, just as intellectual confusion is the result in not being able to define words consistently, a moral paralysis will result in not being able to call any act good or bad at all; sanctity and depravity will no longer be able to be distinguished.
If, for instance, the magnanimity of an individual sharing what he has with those in need is not seen by common consensus as a laudatory virtue to be imitated by all, miserliness cannot be seen as an abhorred vice to be avoided by all. Additionally, if one were to fall victim to subjectivism in their morals, what would prevent one from praising a murderer for the murders he commits or from condemning the pacificist for the lives he doesn't kill by his pacificism?
Traditional ethics is based on the idea that the criteria for determining the rightness or wrongness of an act is first and foremost found in the intrinsic order or disorder of the act itself; that innate goodness or evil is an objective, stable standard that, although culpability may be mitigated by the intention or situation of the subject performing the action, the standard itself can never be fully abolished without detriment to the human understanding of virtue and vice or upright conduct and sin.
But what does all this have to do with flags? It is that flags- like words, like moral acts, like all signs that we humans use to see reality- must be evaluated objectively, without a final, determining concession being given to a subject's whim, opinion, or desire. If we cannot assert that one interpretation of a flag is superior to another interpretation of it, then we might as well claim that one interpretation of an act like pederasty is just as good as any other interpretation of it because pederasty means different things to different people (love is love after all is it not?). While we are at it, why not claim it proper and correct to apply plural pronouns to singular subjects in our everyday speech, butchering the stable, consistent rules of grammar because one person's correct use of grammar could offend another person's image of himself (or should we say themself?). What folly is introduced by such a claim that signs and symbols say different things to different people, how foolish is this sort of relativism! "What is the use of a sign which is itself only another riddle?" C.S. Lewis once asked (Till We have Faces). If we deny ourselves the human ability to effectively communicate with one another through the simple medium of a flag, we should not be surprised as we slide full speed down this slippery slope that leads to intellectual stagnation when words no longer mean anything, or to the stunting of moral growth -if not its outright decay- when deeds can no longer be called good or evil.
We do not have to go down that road full of unknowable riddles. We can weigh the interpretations of both sides of the Gadsden flag debate and consequently say one side is more correct in its appreciation of the flag or the other more correct in demanding its removal. We should be able to say so with the same certainty as when we assert this word means this and not that or that this action is good while that one is evil. So the question finally arises: what does the Gadsden flag say to all those who look upon it?
"Dont Tread On Me" is the simple, literal answer. It is a bit ironic that of all the flags out there, the one flag that has its message written out clearly on its banner is the one flag that appears to carry such ambiguity; but confused is our time when it comes to reading signs.
As we elaborate on the message of the Gadsden flag, we cannot help but realize a historical flag like this one cannot be viewed apart from the context in which it was first flown. South Carolina congressman and colonel Christopher Gadsden designed what is now known to us as the Gadsden flag for the flagship of the first Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy, Commodore Esek Hopkins, during the beginning stages of the Revolutionary War. The symbolism of the snake was popular among the American colonists and was adopted from Benjamin Franklin's imagery of the serpent being a fitting animal to represent young America. In Franklin's own words published in the Pennsylvania Gazette in 1775: "I recollected that her eye excelled in brightness, that of any other animal, and that she has no eye-lids: She may therefore be esteemed an emblem of vigilance...She never begins an attack, nor, when once engaged, ever surrenders: She is therefore an emblem of magnanimity and true courage...As if anxious to prevent all pretensions of quarreling with her, the weapons with which nature has furnished her, she conceals in the roof of her mouth, so that, to those unacquainted with her, she appears to be a most defenseless animal; and even when those weapons are shewn and extended for her defense, they appear weak and contemptible; but their wounds however small, are decisive and fatal...Conscious of this, she never wounds till she has generously given notice, even to her enemy, and cautioned him against the danger of stepping on her." As to not be confused with any other nation, this snake was given thirteen rattles on its tail to represent the thirteen colonies of colonial America.
And so, it is irrefutable that the Gadsden flag, in the context in which it was first hoisted aboard a naval ship in war, entailed what is essentially a defensive message. In its original use, it offered a warning to an aggressor- in this case to the King of England and his troops- to not step on the rights of the colonists lest they strike back in self-defense. For it was a matter of a weaker entity standing up to the growing strength and power of a stronger one. It was a matter of a people who wished to govern themselves freely apart from being subjugated by a tyrant. It was a matter of Americans who felt confident and secure in their own abilities- physically, mentally, and morally- to take care of their own business and not have a king control them from over the sea.
But has this message ossified in time now that the threat of kings and tyrants has passed us? Is this particular interpretation of the Gadsden flag a relic of our nation's past, thus leaving a void open in the flag's interpretation for a more aggressive, ideological to take hold? Now that tyrants are apparently gone, has it paved the way for novel, more radical interpretations to monopolize the Gadsden flag's use?
Though the king may have passed and no looming threat of a British regal subjugation of the States seems likely, it must be remembered that there are other things that can tyrannize besides tyrants. There is what both John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville referred to as "the tyranny of the majority." As early as Mill's 19th-century England, a growing tendency was causing him to worry not so much about protecting citizens from the tyranny of a magistrate but rather of protecting individuals "against the tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them." (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty)
Just as the early Americans had to be on guard against the powerful encroachments of the English crown in their daily life, so too there is a need for us modern Americans to be ever vigilant against this other form of collective tyranny that was being observed as happening over 150 years ago. For what Mill argued was that, though each individual has no right to harm others by what he thinks or does, everything "which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign"(Mill, ibid.). The Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville was praising this same idea as exemplified in the American people whom he admired: "He [the individual] remains master in his own affairs where he is free and answerable only to God for his actions. Out of that grows the general truth that the individual is the sole and best placed judge of his own private concerns and society has the right to control his actions only when it feels such actions cause damage or needs to seek the cooperation of the individual" (Democracy in America). What both men are here speaking about is the age-old debate of the limits of government and an individual's right to intellectual and moral freedom in the face of the collective.
Some people may not be interested in the liberty they are owed as individuals. They feel comfortable enough to accept and obey whatever entity is placed above them and thereby be absorbed into the crowd of those who conform to a uniform thought and conduct imposed on them from those in power. Romano Guardini describes this type of individual whom he refers to as mass man: "Mass man has no desire for independence or originality in either the management or conduct of his life. Nor does he seek to create an environment belonging only to himself, reflecting only his self...The new man of the masses has no desire to live his life according to principles which are uniquely his own. Neither liberty of external action nor freedom of internal judgement seem to have unique value...mass man unites himself with any 'organization' modeled after the mass itself; there he obeys whatever program is placed before him"(Romano Guardini, The End of the Modern World).
But to those others who, still living in a free society choose to not disappear into the collective mass as mass man does, this idea seems abhorrent; for is it not the responsibility of a human to form his own thoughts and choose his own actions if he is to be the free and unique intellectual and moral agent God created him to be? Perhaps the idea that an individual has a right to what he thinks and how he conducts his business may have been considered a revolutionary idea when Gadsden first presented his flag for military use at the outset of the war, but it is almost schizophrenic to think it should still be considered revolutionary today in our modern age that has so defined itself by the celebration of diversity for the sake of diversity while at the same time trying to squash any form of independent thinking as represented by those who appreciate the Gadsden Flag.
Far from being a fringe idea only radicalized conservatives subscribe to, this notion of individual liberty as represented by the Gadsden flag falls directly in line with the flag's original intended meaning as enunciated by the men like Franklin and Gadsden who designed it. One could say that this aforementioned interpretation of the flag's meaning is a coherent evolution from its first use by the American seamen sailing under its shadow in a fight against a king whom they did not want- only now its scope has expanded beyond merely representing the men who first hoisted it on Commodore Hopkins' mast and their nascent nation, its target has moved beyond George III and his redcoats. It can now be seen as a fitting emblem for that classical liberalism of men like Mill and Tocqueville, a liberalism that so defined the founding of our country by asking the question: "When the individual increasingly disappears within the crowd and is readily lost in the obscurity of society...who can say where the demands of power and the servility of weakness will stop?" (Tocqueville, ibid.). The Gadsden flag's meaning now embraces all who feel oppressed by an oppressor, whether that oppressor be a single tyrant, an overreaching government, or an ever-growing collective that bulges at its waist with the fat of its overwhelming influence over its individual members. For when the responsibilities an individual owes to the collective begin to overshadow any recognition of the rights the collective owes to him, the only proper response a man can make is: "Don't Tread On Me!" If the Stars and Stripes are to be thought of as the official title of our country, then Gadsden's Snake must be thought of as its subtitle, for what does the United States of America represent and defend if not the individuals who make up its union?
Presently, can we not hear countless individuals who feel oppressed cry out against the collective giant that so defines our time, a giant not qualitatively but only quantitively bigger than the king of England was in terms of tyrannical influence and control; a giant that desires to make all opinion, all belief, all thought, all conduct uniform for the sake of the collective? Do we not hear these individuals cry out for it to be acknowledged that there is some deep part within them that is not to be told what to think, not to be coerced, not to be touched or tread upon as if it were a slave or, worse yet, an automaton? Have these voices really become silenced in the name of sensitivity to and respect for other individuals' opinion in a way reminiscent of: all animals being equal some are still "more equal than others" (c.f. Animal Farm, George Orwell)? Should it be these who are considered "more equal" than the those who are continually shunned for their ability to think critically? Or, better yet, have those oppressed voices become so silenced by our contemporary obeisance- if not downright groveling- towards public opinion that their voice of dissent can only be heard by those who sympathize with their plight- they who now lie 6-feet under in the old burial grounds of places like Lexington and Concord or Brandwine and Charleston?
Flags, including all signs and symbols, may very well say different things to different people; but sometimes people see things that are not there and hear things that are not said. It is not our duty to indulge this sort of insanity but to help reorient those people to a reality that is, in the end, not as complex as they have made it.
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